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Abstract: The difference between competitive and monopolistic pricing of
airlines' hub-and-spoke networks is examined. It is found that under
reasonable cost conditions pass-through passengers pay lower prices per
mile than those originating or ending at the hub. Thus, higher per/mile
prices in large hubs do not necessarily signal market power.
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1. Introduction.
Airline deregulation has had a profound effect on the way
airlines handle their business. Not only airline pricing has become
substantially more sophisticated, but the role of airline networks has
become crucial in the overall strategy of the industry. Recently,
however, there has been some concern about the pricing in airports that
are dominated by one or two airlines. In particular, it seems that in
those airports, airlines charge relatively higher prices to passengers
originating or whose end point is the hub-airport, than to those
passengers that use the airport exclusively as a hub (see Bailey and
Williams (1988)).
In this note I show that efficient prices in the presence of
capacity constraints would have exactly that characteristic. Market
power or market failure inferences cannot be derived from such
observation.
2. Hub-and-spoke Networks.
Airlines' modern networks are almost all of the hub-and-spoke
type. A hub-and-spoke network consists of two dimensions: physical and
temporal. On the physical dimension, airlines route most of their
flights through the hub-airport. On the temporal dimension, the
airline coordinates its landing and departing times so that passengers
can connect through the hub with a minimum of layover time.
The advantage of a hub-and-spoke network is that it allows an
airline to serve small markets that otherwise would be unprofitable
because of minimum airplane sizes. For example, in the first quarter
of 1982 American Airlines carried between Albany, NY, and Minneapolis-
St Paul, MN , on average 1 passenger a day in direct service and 6
passengers in connecting service. 1 If American Airlines would have to
serve a non-stop flight between those two cities, it would have
preferred not to do so. Having a hub in Chicago allowed American to
carry those passenger, and many others like them.
The hub-and-spoke network, then, is a way to save on fixed costs.
Going through a hub, however, involves longer total travel time. Not
only because of the potential increase in distance, but also because of
the layover time. Thus, for a given fare, the full price of a flight
through a hub is higher than that of a non-stop flight. Passengers
will then require a discount to fly through a hub. On the other hand
airlines will achieve, because of the lumpiness of aircraft, better
load factors in flights going through their hubs than on non-stop
flights. As a consequence, the equilibrium price differential that
will develop between non-stop and connecting flights will just
compensate airlines for the higher costs of the non-stop flight.
To make a hub-and-spoke network competitive, then, airlines have
to find airports that allow them to minimize total flying time for
their passengers. In particular, an already congested airport is not a
good candidate for a hub. Even if enough gate space were available,
the probability of delays would diminish the competitiveness of the
hub, implying that even lower prices would have to be offered to
attract passengers. Similarly, airports located in the middle of the
1 Direct service is defined as a single plane, no connections,
flight. This information is taken from the Origin and Destination
Survey, Reconstructed Data Bank 1A , supplied by the Boeing Computer
Services Inc. Seattle, WA.
country have an advantage as hubs over those in either coast.
3. Price Differences between Pass-through and Local Passengers.
Consider an airline, as in figure 1, that serves 3 cities, A, B
and C, using A as its hub. Because of travelers' preference of direct
over connecting service, 2 it is efficient to route flights in the form
B-A-C rather than having each airplane return to its origin city (i.e.
a B-A-B, C-A-C or A-B-A, A-C-A network).
Assume that each airplane has exactly the same number of
exogenously given seats, K. Furthermore, let the airline be the sole
supplier of flights to A. Hub competition, however, makes parametric
the price for a trip B-C. Call that price P . 3 The demand for each
individual segment is given by the inverse demand functions
P
d
- PjCQj)
with j=AB,AC,BC.
Assume costs are given by a constant marginal cost c (independent
of distance), and by a fixed cost, F, per round trip BC
.
A The problem
for the airline is given by (AP)
Max {(PAB -c)QAB + (PAC -c)QAC + (P -c)QBC - F)
(QboQab.Qac)
s.t. (AP)
Qab + Qbc < k
Qac + Qbc < k
2 See Carlton, Landes and Posner (1980), and Reiss and Spiller
(1988) .
3 Congestion at Che hub will make P an endogenous variable.
4 The marginal cost per passenger c represents for example the
cost of selling and issueing a ticket, airport and bagagge handling.
These costs are assumed to be independent of distance. The results in
this paper will carry through even if c is weakly dependent on
distance. For simplicity, c is assumed to be unaffected by distance.
Letting 8^, j - AB.AC represent the lagrange multipliers
associated with the respective constraints of (AP) , the first order
conditions are given by
Pjd+l/fj) - c - fij, j - AB.AC
P
"
C " 5 AB + 5 AC
(1)
The first order conditions imply that as long as the capacity
constraints are binding (i.e. 6j >0) , the sum of the marginal revenues
has to equal the competitive price P plus c. The solution to (1) is
represented in Figure 2. Observe that if the demand functions were
identical, then, from the constraints to (AP) it follows that
QAB=QAC=K-QBC . Consequently, prices of both segments AB and AC are the
same . Let those prices and quantities be given by P* and Q*
respectively. Substituting P* and Q* into the first order conditions
we obtain
P +c P +c
P* = > (la)
2(1+1/6*) 2
If, however, segment demands are not identical, then the segment
with the larger demand will be quoted a higher price. As long as both
constraints are binding, however, both quantities will be the same. It
is also feasible that the price for the large demand segment will
exceed P . For this to be an equilibrium outcome, however, the two
segments have to have largely different demands. 5
This result provides the economic rationale for the current
This will be the case, for example, if the capacity constraint
is not binding in one segment. In that case, the marginal revenue for
that segment equals the marginal cost c, while for the segment with the
large demand its marginal revenue equals P . Thus, price will exceed,
in this case, the competitive price.
concern about the pricing in "captured" airports. It may be useful to
illustrate this result with an example. An airport that has been said
to be "captured" is St. Louis, where TWA holds a large share of total
departures and landings in that airport. A one way ticket from
Champaign, IL (CMI) , to Los Angeles (what I called the route BC) is
currently (as of July 1988) being quoted at $405 (the price being the
same whether through St. Louis with TWA or through Dayton with
Piedmont). A similar one way ticket from CMI to St. Louis (the segment
BA) currently costs (with TWA) $170, while one from St. Louis to Los
Angeles (the segment AC) is $298. Thus, those passengers using
St. Louis as a hub, going from CMI to LA, pay less than the sum of the
individual segments' fares. The difference in this case is of $63.
It is now worth investigating the structure of optimal prices for
the individual segments. The optimal prices can be derived from (1),
by assuming that the airline behaves as a perfect competitive firm.
That is, it faces perfectly elastic demands for both segments. In this
case, equation (1) implies that the sum of both segment prices has to
equal the competitive price P plus the marginal cost of a passenger c.
This is represented in Figure 3. Again, we find that the sum of the
individual segment prices exceed the price for the whole circuit. If
marginal passengers' cost was zero, then the sum of both prices should
equal the competitive price P .
It is feasible that the optimal price for a single segment be
exactly P
,
as in Figure 4. This is the case when the capacity
constraint in one segment is not binding. Thus, the price for that
segment is just the marginal cost c, while the price for the other
segment is P .
In either case, the sum of both segment prices exceeds the whole
circuit price by the marginal cost of a passenger. Thus, both,
monopoly and efficient competitive pricing imply a similar price
structure. The observation that passengers originating or ending in a
hub pay relatively higher prices than those using the airport as a hub
is not enough to distinguish competitive from monopoly pricing. In the
St. Louis example, without knowledge of actual marginal passenger
costs, we cannot ascertain whether the $63 difference is the result of
monopoly pricing, or whether it just represents a passenger's marginal
cost. Thus, to infer market inefficiencies from pricing, a more
structural analysis is needed.
Finally, there are several airports where multiple carriers have
located their hubs (e.g. Chicago). In those instances, each airline
could bring passengers into the airport and switch them to another
airline so as to accommodate an outbound (or inbound) local passenger.
If passengers are willing to pay a premium for single airline
connections, then the airline that is not able to accommodate the pass-
through passenger will face a loss in revenue. Such revenue loss will
also be charged to the local passenger. It may be that the larger the
number of airlines using the airport as their hub the easier the
connection for the diverted pass -through passenger. In that case, the
discount offered to diverted pass- through passengers may be smaller.
Hence, average prices at hub-airports may fall with the number of
airlines that use the airport as their hub.
Network efficiencies, then, suggest that hub-and-spoke pricing
should tax local passengers. Whether current fare levels at major hubs
are inefficient, remains to be empirically ascertained.
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FIGURE I
Simplest hub -and -spoke network
FIGURE 2
Monopoly Pricing of Two Segments Feeding into the Hub
Q = Q
AC ^AB
- Q
FIGURE 3
Optimal Pricing of Two Segments Feeding into the Hub
AB
AC
Q =0
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FIGURE 4
Optimal Pricing of Two Segments Feeding into the Hub
where the price for a segment equals P
.
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